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INVESTORS MANAGEMENT: INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS AS TIPPEES
Twelve of fifteen institutional investors, "tippees" of Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, have been censured for violations of
section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,' section 10(b) of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934,2 and rule 10b-5 ' promulgated thereunder.
The Hearing Examiner's decision in In re Investors Management Co.'
is the first clear holding that tippees are subject to rule lOb-5 prohibi-
tions.' The SEC on its own motion has taken the legal issues for
review; findings of fact and imposition of sanctions will stand as
determined by the Hearing Examiner.' This Comment will discuss
several issues bearing on liability of institutional investors as tippees.
I. FACTS OF Investors Management
Proceedings against two of the original fifteen respondents were
discontinued; ' the remaining thirteen comprise one registered invest-
' 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964).
2 Id. § 78j (b).
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970). The language of rule lOb-5 is taken from the
language of § 17(a). The prohibitions of rule 10b-5 run against both purchasers and
sellers; the prohibitions of § 17(a) are limited to sellers. Although respondents were
charged with violations of both, the extension of rule 10b-5, because it covers pur-
chasers and sellers, is more significant and throughout this Comment reference will
be made only to the rule.
4 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 77,832 (1970).
5 In Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), friends of controlling
shareholders of a closely held corporation were held liable for trading on inside
information. The court held them liable either as tippees or for aiding and abetting
traditional insiders in violating rule lob-5.
6 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8947 (July 30, 1970), in [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1[77,844. Although neither the Division of Markets
and Trading of the Commission nor any of the respondents appealed from the Hearing
Examiner's decision, the Commission has determined to hold a limited review because
"the legal issues raised respecting the obligations of 'tippees' were important matters
of first impression having significant implications . . . ." Id. Several of the
respondents are challenging the Commission's right to review the decision, alleging
that more than 30 days had passed between the service upon the parties of the initial
decision and the Commission's action and that therefore the period for review had
run. They further contend that the proceedings, limited as they are to legal issues,
are really rulemaking. Although censured, the respondents had not sought review
because they wished to avoid increased unfavorable publicity and substantial legal
expenses. See Statement by Certain Respondents in Response to the Commission's
Orders of July 30, 1970 Directing Review of Legal Issues, In re Investors Manage-
ment Co., in [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1177,832. See
also 17 C.F.R. §201.17(c) (1970).
7 Proceedings were discontinued as to Anchor Corporation and Hartwell, Inc.
The Hearing Examiner held that, although both respondents were in common cor-
porate control with defendants who had violated the law, their relationship with the
wrongdoers was too attenuated to justify liability. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,832, at 83,962.
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ment company,3 two registered investment advisors,9 four unregistered
investment advisors,10 and six "hedge" funds.' During a three day
period in June 1966, these respondents sold 175,800 shares of common
stock of Douglas Aircraft Co.'" while possessing inside, material infor-
mation received from Merrill Lynch. The information-that Douglas'
earnings would be significantly lower than previously expected-was
gathered by Merrill Lynch as part of its investigations as prospective
managing underwriter of a Douglas convertible debenture offering. It
passed prior to its public release from the underwriting department to
several Merrill Lynch institutional salesmen, who thereupon telephoned
several of their leading customers to advise them in fairly specific terms
of the drop in Douglas' earnings.'3 Several of the respondents discussed
the earnings drop at a luncheon, but in much more general terms.' 4
The Hearing Examiner found that twelve respondents had traded
with actual or constructive knowledge ' that the information was non-
public and material; citing In re Cady, Roberts 16 and SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co. (TGS),'17 he held them in violation of rule 10b-5.
These two cases make clear that the obligation to disclose or refrain
from trading does not apply only to those who glean inside information
as a result of traditional corporate relationships.,' The Hearing Exam-
iner held that the obligation extended as well to "tippees," persons who
through an insider become aware of information which should be used
" 'only for a corporate purpose and not for [the] personal benefit of
anyone.' "19
The action against the remaining respondent, Dreyfus Corporation,
was dismissed. The Hearing Examiner found that the Dreyfus decision-
sMadison Fund, Inc.
9J. M. Hartwell & Co.; Van Strum & Towne, Inc.
10 Investors Management Co.; Dreyfus Corp.; Burden Investors Services, Inc.;
Win. A. M. Burden & Co.
11Hartwell & Assoc.; Park Westlake Assoc.; Fleschner Becker Assoc.; Jones
& Co.; Jones Assoc.; Fairfield Partners.
12 See [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 177,832, at 83,930.
'3 Id. at 83,933-35. Initial SEC proceedings against Merrill Lynch were settled,
resulting in the closing of several offices and suspension of personnel for periods
ranging up to 60 days. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8459 (Nov. 25, 1968), in
[1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 77,629.
14 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. f 77,832, at 83,958-60.
15 The constructive knowledge standard imposes liability on the trader if it
appears that he knew or should have known that the information was not yet in
general circulation. Id. at 83,940. This standard apparently imposes an affirmative
duty of inquiry before trading if the information is not dearly public.
1640 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
17401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
18 Insiders traditionally had been considered to include officers, directors, and
major stockholders. A major influence behind this definition was § 16 of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 8 p (1964), the requirements of which were specifically imposed on
these three classes.
19 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,832, at 83,939 (quot-
ing Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912) (bracketed matter omitted by Hearing Exam-
iner).
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maker responsible for the sale of 21,300 shares of Douglas had never
received-and thus the sale was not in connection with-the inside in-
formation concurrently possessed by a Dreyfus analyst."0 Because this
determination apparently rests on factual foundations alone, it will not
be subject to the Commission's review, which will focus solely on the
question whether tippee trading is a violation of rule lOb-5.
II. JURISDICTION OVER THE RESPONDENTS
Before reaching the lOb-5 question, the Hearing Examiner faced
a jurisdictional challenge. Thirteen of the respondents"' argued that
section 15 (b) (7),22 on which the SEC based its jurisdiction, had been
added to the 1934 Act in 1964 to permit the SEC to proceed against
persons associated with broker-dealers. The SEC had previously been
limited to proceeding against the broker-dealers only. Therefore, re-
spondents contended, the term "any person" in the section was limited
to those associated with broker-dealers, and could not apply to them.23
But section 15(b) (7) specifically provides that the Commission
may
by order censure any person, or bar or suspend for a period
not exceeding twelve months any person from being associated
with a broker or dealer, if the Commission finds that such
censure, barring, or suspension is in the public interest and
that such person has committed or omitted any act or omis-
sion enumerated in clause . . . (D) . . . of paragraph (5)
of this subsection . .. .24
Clause (D) includes "willful violations . . . of this title [Exchange
Act] or any rule or regulation under [this Act]." 25 Thus sections
15(b) (7) and 15(b) (5) (D) combine to permit the SEC to proceed
against any person who violates rule 1Ob-5. Moreover, section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act, rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, and section
17(a) of the Securities Act all begin with the language, "It shall be
unlawful for any person."
Citing the clear wording of this section, its legislative history, and
SEC interpretations,26 the Hearing Examiner rejected the respondents'
2 01d. at 83,960-61. The Dreyfus dismissal is further discussed at text accom-
panying notes 47-50 infra.
21All but Anchor Corp. and Van Strum & Towne, Inc.
22 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1964).
2 3 See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Respondent Fleschner Becker Associates'
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 20-22.
24 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (7) (1964) (emphasis added).
25 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (5) (D) (1964).
26 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fmo. Sac. L. REP. 77,832, at 83,931-32.
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argument and correctly held that the SEC could properly proceed
against all of them.
The Hearing Examiner's decision to censure the respondents
should not obscure the significance of finding jurisdiction in this case.
Respondents in a future case could be barred or suspended from being
associated with a broker-dealer for up to twelve months2 Registered
investment advisors might have their registration suspended or re-
voked.29  The 1970 amendments 30 to the Investment Company Act
permit the Commission, after notice and hearings, temporarily or per-
manently to bar from association with an investment company any
person who willfully violates any provision of the Exchange Act or rules
thereunder.3 Further, because their exemption from registration was
removed by the 1970 amendments, 2 investment advisors who advise
only registered investment companies are now liable to administrative
sanctions.
Future respondents are also liable to criminal prosecution under
section 32 (a) of the 1934 Act.' If found guilty, they can be fined up
to $10,000 or imprisoned for up to two years.34 Civil actions are also
possible. The SEC, by bringing proceedings, has identified potential
defendants for would-be plaintiffs. This defendant-identifying effect is
especially significant to plaintiffs in a tippee situation because the dis-
covery of the link between trading and inside information might other-
wise require a tremendous amount of investigation.3 5
Had the SEC been held to lack jurisdiction, the Commission would
have been unlikely to continue the vigorous investigation of those not
27See 5 L. Loss, SECURlTIES REGULATION 3384-87 (Supp. to 2d ed. 1969).
[Section 15(b) (7)] is broad enough to permit a bar or suspension order
(or a censure order, for that matter) against a person who has never been
either a broker-dealer or an associated person.
Id. 3386. Bromberg agrees with this inclusive analysis. See Bromberg, Tippee Risks
and Liabilities, 3 REv. SEC. REG. 875, 878 (1970).
28 See 15 U.S.C. §78o(b) (7) (1964).
29 See id. § 80b-3.
30 Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413.
3'Id. §4(b), 84 Stat. 1415.32 1d. § 24(b) (3), 84 Stat. 1430.
33 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1964).
34_d.
:35 The collateral estoppel effect of findings of fact by a hearing examiner in any
subsequent criminal or civil proceeding is unsettled. Although the modem trend has
been to follow the rule of Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings
Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), and thus to discard the mutuality of
estoppel concept, there may be reasons why private civil actions in securities cases
demand a different result. The Fifth Circuit recently questioned the wisdom of
allowing collateral estoppel in such cases, and then found that the defendant's consti-
tutional right to a jury trial precluded its use as to a previous SEC injunction
action. Rachel v. Hill, No. 29,585 (5th Cir., filed Dec. 3, 1970). The record and
report of an administrative proceeding which leads to sanctions, however, will un-
doubtedly be tremendously valuable to anyone bringing either a civil or criminal
action.
In an SEC proceeding, the violation must be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence. it re Pollisky, Harris Gabriel, Exchange Act Release No. 8141 (Aug.
10, 1967), in [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 77,465.
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within the more narrow broker-dealer class; the possibility of criminal
and civil liability for those not under SEC examination would thus be
greatly reduced. Conversely, with the jurisdiction extended, all those
active in the market know that they are vulnerable to criminal punish-
ment and civil liability as well as to the SEC sanctions of suspending,
barring, or censuring.
III. THE LEGAL ISSUES
Broad language in several earlier cases notwithstanding, the de-
cision of the Hearing Examiner is the first clear holding that tippees
are within the ambit of rule 10b-5. Indeed, the Commission recognized
this in its review order, noting that the decision raised "important
matters of first impression." 36
The decision relied almost exclusively on two well-known cases.
In Cady, Roberts," the SEC censured a brokerage firm partner for
trading on information obtained from an employee of the firm. As a
member of the board of directors of Curtiss-Wright, the employee be-
came aware of a determined-although not yet announced--dividend
reduction. When he passed the information to the partner, the partner
became a tippee3 When the partner traded, he violated sections 17(a)
and 10(b), and rule lOb-5. Building on Cady, Roberts, the Second
Circuit in TGS 39 held liable a number of TGS employees who had
traded upon nonpublic information concerning the magnitude of a
Canadian ore strike. Again, the use of material inside information was
found to violate section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
Relying specifically on these two cases, the Hearing Examiner held
that the "obligation of affirmative disclosure extends beyond those who
happen to hold traditional corporate insider information or relation-
ships." 4o Yet despite the broad language of the previous cases, the
move to tippee liability is neither as inevitable nor as trouble free as the
Hearing Examiner suggests.
First, the Second Circuit reserved the question of tippee liability
in its discussion of the TGS defendants:
As Darke's [one of the insider defendants] "tippees" are
not defendants in this action, we need not decide whether, if
they acted with actual or constructive knowledge that the
material information was undisclosed, their conduct is as
36 Note 6 atpra.
37 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
38 Although the SEC could have dealt with the partner as a tippee, it found
that, because the tipper-employee's relationship to Curtiss-Wright prohibited his own
use of the information, by "logical sequence" the partner in the firm of the employee
was similarly prohibited.
39 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
40 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 77,832, at 83,939.
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equally violative of the Rule as the conduct of their insider
source, though we note that it certainly could be equally
reprehensible.41
Moreover, in expanding the rule's scope, the Hearing Examiner
rested on two premises first articulated in Cady, Roberts and relied upon
thereafter in TGS. Both these premises-(1) that rule 10b-5 extends
beyond those traditionally considered corporate insiders, and. (2) that
the Commission will try to insure some sort of rough equality in the
market through 10b-5-were enunciated in language that seems to fore-
shadow this extension to tippees. The Commission in Cady, Roberts
defined the obligation not to trade required by rule 10b-5:
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal ele-
ments; first, the existence of a relationship giving access,
directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available
only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit
of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where
a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is un-
available to those with whom he is dealing.
42
This language, however, contains not only a suggestion that rule 10b-5
be greatly extended but also an indication of its limit. The information
received by tippees in situations like that of Investors Management is
not passed to them for a corporate purpose-at least, not from Douglas'
point of view. The information was passed from Douglas to Merrill
Lynch for an obvious corporate purpose, but Merrill Lynch served no
Douglas corporate purpose in passing it to its clients. Merrill Lynch
had its own corporate purpose in transmitting the information to its
clients, but neither that corporate purpose nor a colorable claim that
Merrill Lynch owed its clients some sort of fiduciary duty to pass the
information should prevent a finding of liability. A middle ground
is reached when a company director talks with an institutional analyst.
The analyst performs an invaluable service by fanning the public in-
terest in the company and the director will want to maintain a good
relationship with him. Thus the information passes for a corporate
purpose. The situation differs from the Douglas-Merrill Lynch trans-
fer because here the director passes information with the understanding
that the analyst may trade on it. Yet it falls short of the Merrill
Lynch-client situation-and thus makes the question of 10b-5 liability
much more difficult-insofar as neither the director nor the analyst
knowingly deals in inside information. A director's tip to a friend,
of course, is unprotected, if only because the information passes for no
corporate purpose.
41401 F.2d at 852-53.
4240 S.E.C. at 912 (footnotes omitted).
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The problems do not stop with trying to define "corporate pur-
pose." How should a relationship giving access to inside information
be defined? How indirect must the access be before the language of
Cady, Roberts will cease to apply? Professor Mundheim has suggested
that, because the definitions of what constitutes material, nonpublic
information remain imprecise, and because some public service is per-
formed by the information-gathering functions of institutional invest-
ors, there may be reason to apply lOb-5 restrictions less severely to
them than to either the classic insider or the classic tippee, whose
trading produces no particular public good. 3 The point herein is
simply that these questions were not dealt with adequately by the
Hearing Examiner, and that the Commission should not repeat his
omissions. The next section will discuss in greater detail the possible
distinctions to be made in light of the institutional investor's function.
IV. MARKET FUNCTIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
The Hearing Examiner failed to consider whether prohibitions
against insider trading or trading by casual tippees such as friends of
corporate officers are appropriately applied to institutional investors.
Institutional investors operate full time in assessing investment oppor-
tunities; the essence of their operation is their ability and willingness
to gather large quantities of corporate information. Their role in in-
formation gathering and investment assessment affords them an impor-
tant position in the market. The casual tippee, on the other hand,
provides no service to the market, but merely takes advantage of
gratuitous information. This distinction between the institutional in-
vestor and the individual tippee should not be dismissed lightly.
Information in the hands of the institutional investor may often be
difficult to characterize as either inside or the product of thorough inves-
tigation. To penalize an incorrect categorization may tend to inhibit
thorough investigation. And, to the extent that the institutional in-
vestor is uncertain about the status of information, it will naturally
tend to curtail its own use of the information and to prevent its dis-
semination to other investors. Investors Management is a good example
of the difficulties inherent in determining that a respondent's knowledge
of given information is inside.
The Hearing Examiner imposed upon the respondents a standard
of actual or constructive knowledge.44 As applied to an individual
tippee, this standard makes eminent good sense, for he will be likely to
know from the nature of the information and the circumstances of its
43 Mundheim, Insider Trading-A Tentative Draft Outline, in THE LAW, Dis-
CLOSURE AND THE SECURITIES MARKET MATERIALS 43-53 (PLI 1970).
4 4 Note 15 supra & accompanying text.
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transmission that he is receiving inside information. In fact, the infor-
mation will frequently be presented as nothing more or less than an
"inside tip." Thus to apply to him either an actual or constructive
knowledge standard will not bring about dramatically different results.
But the constructive standard as applied to institutional investors may
be quite a different matter. Communication within the small and fairly
closed institutional investors' community is extensive. Information held
by a member of the community is not easily characterized. Occasionally
the information source will make clear the nature of the information,
but more often than not ambiguity may be the rule. For example, how
should a rumor abroad within the community be characterized? In
Investors Management, the inside information was circulating at an
investors' luncheon.
The Hearing Examiner has thus imposed an affirmative duty on
institutional investors to determine the character of all their information.
The potential ramifications on the flow of information within the market
community were apparently not explored and certainly not articulated.
The institutional and individual tippee also stand on different foot-
ing in determining the information's "materiality." Although some
alleged "hot tips" may be a far cry from material inside information, an
individual receiving a "tip" is seldom able to claim that it did not
determine his investment decision: he presumes and hopes for an inside
edge, and his actions are usually attributable to this single "tip." But
to the institutional investor, the inside information may be only one
piece of a larger and more sophisticated puzzle, the total solution of
which determines the investment decision.
A full-scale policy analysis of whether greater consideration must
be given to the economic consequences to institutional investors is not
intended herein. But it should be borne in mind that in many cases the
information-gathering efforts of the institutional investors have been
prods to reticent corporations, increasing the flow of information in the
market.45 And it must be recognized that, despite their positive aspects,
decisions like TGS and Investors Management have to some degree
inhibited information gathering.46 Certainly careful regulation of the
securities market is necessary so that small investors will be convinced
that they are entering a "fair and honest market." Yet mutual funds,
pension fund managers, banks, and insurance companies-institutional
investors all-are conduits to the market for the capital of the small
investor. The extent to which the small investor is hurt by the inability
45 See Mundheim, Beware of How You Handle That Tip, INsT. INv., Sept. 1970,
at 40, 42.
46 Several representatives of mutual funds reported that the flow of information
had recently decreased markedly, specifically because of TGS. They felt that Investors
Management had not yet further decreased the flow-in part a function of their
expectation that the full Commission will reverse the Hearing Examiner's holding.
Interview with four mutual fund representatives, in Philadelphia, Oct. 30, 1970
(anonymity requested).
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of these money managers to acquire legitimate information is an im-
portant economic consideration to be weighed in any decision curtailing
the flow of information to these managers. In its review of the Hear-
ing Examiner's decision, then, the Commission should consider and
articulate responses to these questions bearing on tippee liability in the
institutional context.
V. THE DREYFUS CORPORATION DISMISSAL
The Hearing Examiner found that, although the Dreyfus analyst
was at all relevant times in possession of the same inside information as
the censured defendants, the decisionmaker, Dreyfus President Howard
Stein, was not made aware of the specific information when he decided
to sell the Douglas stock. Rather than reveal that his recommendation
was based on inside information and thus possibly unusable, the analyst
approached Stein with an emphatic recommendation to sell based on
other research information unrelated to the Merrill Lynch tip. With
the recommendation, and observing the day's performance of the stock,
Stein decided to sell. The Hearing Examiner held:
[A] lthough on June 23 Dreyfus Corporation possessed inside
corporate information regarding Douglas earnings, no use
was made of that information in connection with the sale that
day of the Dreyfus Fund's holdings of Douglas stock ...
[I]t is concluded that Dreyfus Corporation did not commit
the violations charged . . .47
The Hearing Examiner has thus held that no liability will attach
to trading if the flow of material inside information within the institu-
tional investor stops short of the decisionmaker. This holding may be
limited to the specific facts of the Dreyfus situation. Mr. Stein is widely
known for his reliance on his own knowledge of recent stock perform-
ances; 48 thus the dismissal may be based only on the putative minimal
effects of the analyst's urgings in this instance. The dismissal is not so
articulated, however, and if given full scope might be interpreted as per-
mitting certain trading by an institutional investor with inside infor-
mation. If the analyst possessing the information is sufficiently circum-
spect in his reasons for his recommendation, the Hearing Examiner
would apparently find trading protected.
Industry members have agreed that this practice is now being fol-
lowed in some places, and that it is acceptable to them: 49 better to trade
for the "wrong" reasons than not to trade at all.
47 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 77,832, at 83,961.
48See TirE, Aug. 24, 1970, at 52-57.
49 See Interview, supra note 46.
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Although unlikely to survive SEC scrutiny, various schemes may
develop along these lines should the Hearing Examiner's approach in
this case rest untouched. More subtle than the emphatic but undocu-
mented recommendation given to a decisionmaker who reads between
the lines is the recommendation stressing those aspects of the stock's
performance which veil the analyst's reliance on inside information.
Such spurious reports may not be limited to inside information situa-
tions alone. As pointed out above,"° categorizing information is not
always an easy matter: recommendations may be camouflaged whenever
the analyst has the slightest doubt about the status of his information.
Again, the result may be the right decision made for the wrong reasons.
CONCLUSION
The problem raised by Investors Management-whether the pro-
hibitions of section 10(b), rule 10b-5, and section 17 (a) should be en-
forced against tippees-may be answered by the broad language of
Cady, Roberts and TGS. Yet the extension of rule lOb-5 to tippees
goes significantly beyond either of these cases. In determining the
wisdom of this application, the Commission must consider the role of
institutional investors in the market, appreciating their information-
gathering functions. It must consider the economic implications of the
extension of 10b-5 liability, and the difficulties in defining the elements
of any rule imposed.
5 Text following note 44 supra.
1971]
